


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**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

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JPRS-NEA-93-057

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Regional Affairs

Gaza PFLP Threatens To Split From Damascus

93AF0494B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
7 Apr 93 p 3

[Reported from the Center for Political Studies in London and from AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Amman]

[Text] The Gaza Strip branch of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by Dr. George Habash has frozen its contacts with the PFLP leadership in Damascus, warning that it would break away from it organizationally and politically if there was not a thorough review of all the resolutions of the fifth conference. The conference was held about two months ago and yielded a sweeping victory for the hardline tendency represented by the Secretary-General, Dr. Habash, against the tendency considered closer to the viewpoint of the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

An official source in the PFLP confirmed to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that Dr. Habash had recently fired lawyer Dr. Yunis al-Jiru, one of the PFLP leaders in Gaza, after differences that blew up between them in their recent meeting in Damascus.

He explained that the defeat of Abu-Nidal Musallami in the elections conducted at the conference (he was considered a moderate figure, and the organization's direct official in Gaza) was one of the reasons that made the Popular Front leadership think of punishing Habash and the Front leadership in Damascus.

Popular Front sources said that the Gaza Strip command and its bases belonging to the Popular Front felt, after the defeat of the moderate tendency in the conference—after Musallami's defeat specifically—that it had become isolated, and so assigned lawyer Yunis al-Jiru to talk with George Habash in Damascus about means of restoring confidence between Gaza and the PFLP. Habash, however, refused al-Jiru's request that al-Musallami be returned to his position in the Front, responsible for the occupied territories, which then escalated the sharpness of the disagreement between them, and led to the announcement of al-Jiru's firing from the Gaza leadership. These sources said that al-Jiru responded to Habash by announcing that Gaza would not take political or military orders from any new official and that Musallami would still be considered in charge.

These sources indicated that al-Jiru would have given Habash a completed memorandum containing many of his organizational and political methods in the name of the Gaza command, most prominently these demands: the need to agree upon a political process, the need to end the alliance with Hamas in the framework of the ten factions that have based themselves in Damascus, and the need to review the resolution suspending the PFLP's membership in the PLO Central Committee. PFLP sources confirm that this disagreement had effectively created a state of schism between the PFLP in Damascus and its Gaza command, that things between the two

sides were beginning to worsen, and that the Gaza branch would be capable of proclaiming an official split from the PFLP.

Other sources told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that two of the Popular Front's Gaza Strip command visited Damascus recently, bringing with them the decision to the Front's politburo, and that those two officials held prolonged talks with Habash. They were able to extract a promise from him to hold a small-scale conference, a "congress," within a few months, to examine their request related to the West Bank branch. The information indicates the existence of a moderate wing in it, in sympathy with the Gaza branch, represented by Riyad al-Maliki, but this wing was unable to express itself due to the existence of an overwhelmingly hardline tendency in sympathy with Hamas.

Many Palestinian observers believe that the Popular Front is liable to have a new split and that the hard-line position Dr. Habash has adopted has united two tendencies that were apart: those of the above-mentioned Abu-Nidal Musallami and of Assistant Secretary General Abu-'Ali Mustafa, who for several reasons has inclined toward moderation recently.

'Ashrawi Discusses Delegation Membership

93AF0501A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
10 Apr 93 p 3

[Report by 'Ali Salih]

[Excerpts] London—Dr. Hanan 'Ashrawi, official spokesman of the Palestinian negotiation delegation, has viewed Israel's approval of Faysal al-Husayni's participation in the delegation as a positive step, emphasizing that it is the Palestinian people's right to form their own delegation. In a statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 'Ashrawi said, "This step has its dimensions and indications. But it must be followed by other specific, clear, and binding steps." [passage omitted]

Talking to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT on phone from her residence in Jerusalem, 'Ashrawi said, "It is one of our rights to form the delegation."

Responding to a question on the Palestinian side's ceding of this right when the peace process was initiated in Madrid and on allowing Israel to dictate its conditions on this particular point, 'Ashrawi said, "We ceded this point temporarily so as to foil Israel's opportunity, rather so as not to give Israel the excuse not to participate." She added: "We did not cede this point but rather postponed it on agreement with the conference sponsors."

As to whether this step is enough for the Palestinian delegation to return to the negotiation table in Washington, 'Ashrawi said, "This is a step forward. But it is not enough, because we have other clear demands on this issue, namely commitment by Israel to abandon the deportation policy, human rights in the occupied territories, the negotiation authority issue, the deportees question, and other matters."

It is to be noted that Israel agreed to the change in the Palestinian delegation by returning to the negotiation table. Peres himself expressed this point when he said, "Before anything else, Palestinians must return to the negotiations, and we will see if such a proposal is needed to advance the negotiations."

The Americans embrace this position also, and they expressed it at their meetings with the Palestinians in Washington at the end of last March. 'Ashrawi has emphasized this point, saying: "The Americans agree with the Israelis on the return of the Palestinians to the negotiating table first and before any change is accepted," but she asserted that the Palestinian position is that the "return should coincide with fulfillment of the Palestinian demands."

The official spokesman added: "If there are specific, tangible, and complete steps and commitments at all levels, then we will evaluate them in their totality and will make our decision on the basis of this evaluation." She insisted that "these steps must be detailed, specific, and binding, not just general, retractable promises."

Responding to a question about whether the U.S. proposal on participation by al-Husayni and other Jerusalem citizens in the bilateral talks emanates from a U.S. conviction that this is a Palestinian right or whether it is just a bait to encourage the Palestinians to return to the negotiation table, 'Ashrawi said, "Both." Answering a question about whether there is a prior U.S.-Israeli agreement on this point, 'Ashrawi said, "I believe that there is prior Israeli agreement on this point. This is how things are when matters concern the Palestinian issue."

This is confirmed by a source close to the Israeli prime minister, who said, "In a message to the U.S. State Department after his visit to Washington in the middle of last month, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin responded positively to the United States' request to accept al-Husayni as a delegation member."

As to the fate of Dr. Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi, the current head of the Palestinian delegation, in case al-Husayni participates in the delegation, 'Ashrawi said, "The makeup will stay as it is, meaning that al-Husayni will continue to be the head of the Palestinian [advisory] team, and 'Abd-al-Shafi will be the head of the delegation to the bilateral negotiations." To a question on whether there is a link between the recent press statements made by 'Abd-al-Shafi on his refusal to head the delegation if the deportees are not repatriated and on his wish to step down as a delegation chairman because of his advanced years, 'Ashrawi said, "'Abd-al-Shafi will continue to be the delegation chairman, and there will be no change." [passage omitted]

'Abd-al-Shafi: No Compromise Solutions

93AF0501B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
10 Apr 93 p 6

[Interview with Dr. Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi, head of the Palestinian delegation to the peace negotiations, by

Muhammad 'Ali al-Qulaybi in Tunis; date not given: "No Compromise Solutions on Israel's Adherence to Legitimacy"]

[Text] Tunis—Dr. Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi, head of the Palestinian delegation to the peace negotiations, said that there are no compromise solutions regarding Israel's adherence to the United Nations' legitimate authority and that there is no excuse to relieve Israel from respecting this legitimate authority. 'Abd-al-Shafi, who talked to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT during his visit to the Tunisian capital to attend the Palestinian leadership meeting, said, "The deportees issue, the significance of which I do not belittle, may seem as if it were the main issue standing in the way of resuming the negotiations. But the fact is that the negotiations as a whole are the top consideration." The following is the text of the interview:

[Al-Qulaybi] If the PLO decides, for special considerations, to attend the forthcoming round of negotiations before the deportees are repatriated, will you participate, or will you cling to your refusal?

['Abd-al-Shafi] The general Palestinian tendency is that there should be a united Palestinian stance in order to avoid any split in the Palestinian position, especially because the considerations that determine participation or nonparticipation are extremely important and serious. It is my opinion that there should be no division in the Palestinian position.

[Al-Qulaybi] What do you mean by the phrase "considerations...are extremely important and serious?"

['Abd-al-Shafi] Outwardly, the deportees issue seems as if it is the immediate and sensitive issue, but the fact is that the negotiations as a whole are the top consideration. I say this without belittling the fact that the deportation decision is a measure that contradicts the principle of human rights. But let me say that in my opinion, the decision to expel this large number of Palestinians is an extension of the position that Israel takes at the negotiating table, namely, its failure to respect the peace authority, which is embodied by Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. So the deportation problem is inherent in Israel's failure to respect and to abide by the principles of the international law and the UN resolutions.

[Al-Qulaybi] What do you propose as a compromise solution to overcome this crisis?

['Abd-al-Shafi] In my opinion, there are no compromise solutions because of the importance of adherence to the UN legitimate authority and of respecting UN resolutions. There is no excuse to relieve Israel from the duty of respecting the UN legitimate authority. Our position does not exceed this consideration and is in harmony with the importance of respecting the UN legitimate authority. Consequently, we are posing no conditions here, even though it may seem outwardly as if we are. The truth of the matter is that all we request is that Israel adhere to the legitimate authority of the United Nations.

[Al-Qulaybi] Do you expect to reach a satisfactory solution with Israel?

[Abd-al-Shafi] I cannot foretell what will happen between now and the time the ninth session is convened. We continue to be in contact with the U.S. sponsor.

In fact, through our position, which demands respect for the UN legitimate authority, we wish to make the path as easy as possible, without undermining the principle. We also say that this position does not mean that we have abandoned the peace process or withdrawn from it. What I mean is that we will be prepared to participate in any peace process that has true credibility.

[Al-Qulaybi] In one of his statements, 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Rantisi criticized you and said that the Palestinian negotiating delegation "does not represent us as much as it represents itself." What is your comment?

[Abd-al-Shafi] The truth is that I do not feel that I need to respond to such statements.

There is evidence of that as far the representation issue is concerned. It is true that representation comes by way of free election. But this is impossible because of the dispersal of Palestinians in the diaspora. However, it suffices to say that when we went to Madrid and returned to the occupied territories, we were received with such general support from the Palestinian masses that the opposition factions, led by Hamas, were compelled to bow before this sweeping popular expression. I believe that al-Rantisi remembers this.

[Al-Qulaybi] But this sweeping popular support to which you have referred existed at the outset of the peace process only. It has diminished now and has turned into opposition.

[Abd-al-Shafi] This is true. The sweeping popular support for the peace process and for the Palestinian negotiation delegation began to diminish gradually because of failure to make progress in the negotiations and because of Israeli actions in the occupied territories, whether in the form of the continued settlement process or in the acts that oppress the population and contradict human rights principles. The deportation decision represented a strong blow to the peace process. In fact, the current position of the masses in the occupied territories demands withdrawal from the negotiations. I appreciate the masses' disappointment and their despair about the peace process. Naturally, our current position on not going to the negotiations represents fundamentally our personal convictions, and it reflects our respect for the masses' sentiments at this moment. But emotional positions are taken at certain moments.

As I have said, we will not go to the negotiation table unless there is response to what we demand, namely that Israel adhere to the UN legitimate authority. But as I have also said, this does not mean our withdrawal from or our disavowal of the principle of peace. This is a position that the PNC [Palestine National Council] has adopted and one on which there can be no backing down.

We believe that the Israeli position continues to create an obstacle on the path. We reject this position, and we continue to demand that Israel submit to the UN legitimate authority. We appeal to the entire world, and to the democratic world in particular, to confront this Israeli defiance because it constitutes defiance to all declared UN principles and values.

[Al-Qulaybi] Do you think that the current U.S. Administration is actually serious about developing a just settlement in the Middle East?

[Abd-al-Shafi] To date, it is evident that the U.S. Administration has taken a position that favors the Israeli side. This does, in fact, deprive this administration of the eligibility that a negotiations sponsor should have. We point this out constantly, and we remind the U.S. side that this biased position is incompatible with a sponsor's role. We will continue to ask the U.S. Administration to change this approach if it really wants a just peace.

[Al-Qulaybi] How do you view the new U.S. proposal that has it playing the role of a full partner in the peace negotiations?

[Abd-al-Shafi] To date, U.S. deeds have not tallied with U.S. words, and the meaning of the phrase "full partner" has not been defined yet.

In our opinion, one of the tasks of the conference sponsor is to see that the parties to the negotiations respect the referential authority on the negotiations, which, as proclaimed, consists of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

[Al-Qulaybi] Why didn't you participate in the Palestinian delegation that recently met with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher?

[Abd-al-Shafi] I decided to participate in the meeting of the frontline foreign ministers and Arab negotiating delegations that was held in Damascus at the same time.

I believe that the issue of Arab coordination is important under these circumstances so we can have a united position.

[Al-Qulaybi] What direction do you want the Arab position to take: participation or boycott?

[Abd-al-Shafi] The issue will be settled at the next meeting in Damascus, which is likely to be held on 12 April.

[Al-Qulaybi] What is your opinion about the qualitative change in the intifadah, i.e., the shift from stones to knives and firearms?

[Abd-al-Shafi] I cannot call this phenomenon a qualitative change because it is still a spontaneous phenomenon that has no leadership-level planning. Most often, it emanates from individuals as a consequence of severe hardship and of the conditions of physical, psychological, and economic suppression by the Israelis. It also comes as an expression of the feeling of frustration and despair.

In my opinion, a planned qualitative change that emanates from a leadership has to be the result of good evaluation, sound planning, and selection of the appropriate targets.

[Al-Qulaybi] Do you still hold to your position on the issue of Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, keeping in mind that you have viewed such withdrawal as a political crime if it occurs without prior notification?

[Abd-al-Shafi] First, I say that what we are discussing is tantamount to no more than some Israeli voices that have risen to demand a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. My impression is that, to date, there is no serious and official Israeli tendency toward such a withdrawal.

Second, we are negotiating for a comprehensive political solution, not for the Gaza Strip alone. The Gaza Strip does not have a special distinguishing feature to make us negotiate for it independently. I believe that we should develop an agreement within the comprehensive political negotiations and that priority should be given to withdrawal from Gaza, but within a comprehensive framework.

However, if after clarifying all these considerations Israel still wants to withdraw from Gaza unilaterally within the context of its own wish, then we will not beg it to stay.

The thing that I will reaffirm is that if Israel has such a wish, then we will not agree to set conditions for such a withdrawal. We also hope that Israel will notify us in ample time so that we can take the precautions necessary to maintain law and order and a normal course of life.

[Al-Qulaybi] It is said that you are an extremist and that your presence as the head of the Palestinian negotiation delegation constitutes some embarrassment for those who wish to participate in the negotiations without [prior] conditions.

[Abd-al-Shafi] I do not consider myself an extremist, unless the matter concerns adherence to a straightforward negotiation process. This accusation may have emanated from the U.S. side or Israeli side. This would not be surprising because both sides' positions are still incompatible with the legitimate considerations. The main problem in the negotiations is the question of Israel's respect for this legitimacy. This is what I am fighting for, and I do not think that one who is engaged in such a fight can be characterized as an extremist. I am confident that there are numerous Palestinian brothers who can perform the task I am performing currently.

[Al-Qulaybi] Have you entertained the idea of withdrawing from the leadership of the Palestinian negotiating delegation?

[Abd-al-Shafi] Absolutely not, and nobody has asked me to do so. Even though I am not comfortable personally because of my advanced age, I believe that I am performing a national duty, and I see no reason to abandon it at this moment.

[Al-Qulaybi] Why do you cling to carrying on with the negotiations, even though no noteworthy positive results have been recorded to date?

[Abd-al-Shafi] We embarked on the peace process fully prepared to attain a just and honorable peace. Afterward, certain developments forced us to carry on with the process, even though we became convinced of its futility. These developments are particularly embodied in, first, the Israeli elections, which brought the Labor Party to power, and second, the U.S. election, which led to President Bill Clinton's victory. These considerations made us carry on and stay in the negotiation process, even though it has made no progress.

Even now, we are very eager to make it clear that if the negotiation process collapses, then we are not the party responsible for this collapse. This is why we are patient. If the peace process collapses, the conditions will worsen, and radicalism and violence will proliferate at a large scale. We certainly do not want to be responsible for the development of such a serious situation.

Agha: Closure Could Be 'Fatal Blow' To Talks

93P501624 London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI in Arabic
13 Apr 93 p 5

[Excerpts] Amman, Jerusalem—A Palestinian official has warned that widespread starvation could strike the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip if the blockade imposed by the Israeli occupation authorities continues for long. He said that this situation presages a great explosion, for which all will pay the price—including Israel—and may be the fatal blow to the peace process.

Palestinian delegation member Zakariya Agha explained in an interview with Jordanian newspaper AL-RAY yesterday that 80 percent of the Gaza Strip's population is living under the poverty line, and this percentage is likely to increase if the Israeli blockade continues. He pointed out that 80,000 workers from the Gaza Strip work in Israel, both officially and unofficially.

He added that although the Palestinian commitment to the peace process is a fundamental, strategic commitment, there must be positive results from the negotiations. He asserted that no progress has been made, particularly in the areas of human rights and Israeli practices against the Palestinian people. [passage omitted]

Following a meeting held the day before yesterday at the Palestinian Lawyer's Federation headquarters in Gaza, national institutions have asked for help from the world's conscience, UN and human rights organizations from all over the world, the Red Cross, and Arab and foreign consulates and embassies, in halting [occupation] practices and human rights violations. They requested "international protection for the population of the occupied territories under these harsh circumstances."

In a related item, Arab parties active in Palestinian circles in the 1948 region [Israel] announced their intention to organize a campaign to collect donations for the Palestinians in the occupied Gaza Strip. [passage omitted]

Feature Profiles Nusaybah's Working Groups

93AA0017 London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 16,
17 Mar 93

[Article by Rabi'i al-Madhun: "Four Active Islands Remake 1993 Intifadah"]

[16 Mar p 6]

[Text] The chairman of the steering committee of the Palestinian delegation to the peace negotiations, Faysal al-Husayni, following his return to Amman from Madrid, faced the first development of its kind with regard to organizing the framework of political action in support of the negotiating process. The first details of this were engineered with former American Secretary of State James Baker and, later, with the leaders who would apply them in the field. During a reception prepared for al-Husayni at the al-Hakwati Theater in Jerusalem, on the day after al-Husayni's arrival, Lawyer Ziyad Abu-Ziyad announced the formation of political working groups in the occupied territories. To those present, he read the names of their members (AL-HAYAH, 13 November 1991). This astonished al-Husayni, whose first reaction was "dissatisfaction" with this step taken in his absence, in which Dr. Sari Nusaybah had participated. Nusaybah is the second leading figure of the "centrist group" in the PLO, after al-Husayni and before Ziyad Abu-Ziyad. The steering committee's chairman had come to that place raising olive branches and basking in the elation of the Palestinians over the first successes that their delegation had achieved in Madrid, in their first test of this kind at that level. However, as a leader, he understood that the announcement of these groups represented the start of a change that must not "undermine" his occasion because of certain small details. He hastened to put matters on the centrist track. One day later, he gave the new organizations his legitimacy, letting it be known that what Nusaybah and Abu-Ziyad had done was "in accordance with an organizational decision." Everyone read the birth certificate. As for the delivery, it did not escape questions about whether the three leading figures' dispute reflected competition for leadership, according to the thinking of some, had sprung from disputes over division of labor, or was a judgement about the best way to erect the barricades of domestic peace and draw the map of the trenches that will connect them!

These questions went away with the subsequent stages of negotiations amid the flourishing of the spring of peace. However, they returned—in a different way—in the autumn of the negotiations, which finished off whatever green leaves remained. The negotiations' crews began to frequent Orient House in Jerusalem, which Israeli circles

dubbed the "headquarters of Palestinian self-government." There, work went on between the negotiators and the technical committees to enter, periodically, into the best coordinating posture. Outside the building, questions circulated about what was going on, especially after subsequent announcements regarding the formation of a supreme council in the West Bank in the fields of culture, media, etc. The first and biggest question revolved around the "mystery" of rushing toward creating political and administrative organizations when the areas of peace and negotiations were getting close to the point of the failure of the peace process itself, which would expand the area of the war front and confrontation to extend over the length and breadth of the occupied territories. This generated more questions about the significance of, at times, occupying the Palestinians with building barricades for war while the spring of peace was flourishing and with building barricades of peace under the storms of the autumn of negotiations, as if they wanted—in some sense—"to destroy" peace by war and "weaken" war by negotiations.

However, decisively defining work areas in terms of black and white might conceal the gray areas between them and lessen their importance. The situation that the occupied territories are witnessing does not contain such a contradiction. Perhaps they were fed, in previous stages, by interlocking efforts and the crossing of trends between rejection and acceptance. The correction to negotiations appears to have entered a bottleneck.

Therefore, where do we begin? How do our questions find the answers that we seem to have lost?

No one is reluctant to admit the Palestinians' increased trend toward developing a kind of temporary disassociation from the peace process, turning their backs on several of its aspects. However, many think it doubtful that this development will be given permanency, considering it to be another aspect of the changing general popular mood. It is true that the general scene, which is marked by "clouds of tumult and violence" spreading over the collapsing peace efforts, is not lacking in sufficient evidence about the truth of that first allegation, but the details expose movements "under the surface," recreating policies and restoring necessary bridges and conduits of communication between the various agencies of negotiation and activists of the intifadah, and extending lines between political positions. This includes closing the gap between opponents and antagonists, in light of two facts that emerged with the issue of the deportees. They proved that the "extremists" [al-mufaratin] still hold fast to their fixed negotiating terms. They are trying, first of all, to move the peace process closer to those terms. Even if the Palestinian rejection was a positive "mistake," which ought to restore some consideration to it, they used the rules of this game to exert positive pressure in order to create change on the Palestinian domestic level, as well as on foreign levels in neighboring areas.

This analysis includes tacit bargaining between dissimilar political courses and the activities of Palestinians in

the occupied territories. The bargaining, for its part, contains mutual concessions between those who want to deal with matters of peace by escalating war on the negotiations and those who want to deal with the effects of occupation by supporting the barricades of peace. This is what we will discuss in detail.

The West Bank and Gaza Strip are united on the "divisive" aspect of four activist "islands," which appear to those in uniform to be contradictions. They include building and rebuilding structures and institutions, armed and other violent operations, overt political activities, and efforts to resume bilateral negotiations on the condition of resolving the problem of the deportees and applying Resolution 799. All of these "islands" reflect one of the following trends:

1. Looking at the "lost peace" time as an opportunity to develop the domestic action front. Supporters of this direction apply logic that says that if peace is actually derailed, one should not copy it or emulate its mistakes. Therefore, the Palestinian negotiators should develop their technical expertise on another level, reshuffle their negotiating cards, make independent plans, improve their teams' performance, and prepare for future negotiations. Peace negotiations are final; there is no withdrawal from them, even though they are subject to obstructions.
2. Taking what the peace process has concluded so far, considering any action toward that end as "a waste of time and a chase after phantom solutions."
3. This trend reflects its proponents' uneasiness over changing the process of rebuilding some of the institutions and establishing supreme councils. They think that this would open the door to several "dangers," led by nonparticipation in the early race for seats of power, which have not yet been established and, perhaps, will not be established in the near future.
4. This trend attempts to blend together previous considerations and positions, stating a lack of opposition to any political or organizational-administrative activity, which can be justified by the needs and essential requirements of Palestinians to do what is best for their social, economic, and political lives. It would also have reservations to the effect that certain organizations on these levels are "premature."

Despite these considerations, one can enter Orient House in Jerusalem, from which some emphasize that visitors derive a great deal of strength for their activities, and meet certain "self-government ministers," as the newspaper YERUSHALAYIM (11 December 1992) put it, referring to Palestinian sources exchanging ideas and proposals with regard to forming a Palestinian "shadow government," led by al-Husayni. It would contain 18 persons, who would assume the affairs of the media, police, religious affairs, health, transportation, education, tourism, energy, communications, culture, social welfare, water, supply, agriculture, and trade. Observers call attention to the fact that these proposals and ideas

contain a similarity between the number of proposed spheres of authority and the Israeli delegation's proposal to the Palestinian negotiators in the fifth and sixth bilateral sessions and later, which contained a partial offer to assume authority in 18 fields. However, in general, those watching over these activities start from the premise of exercising policy inside the negotiation rooms and examining various solutions, in accordance with the development of mutual proposals outside those rooms. The purpose is to establish principles and create institutional structures that are more empirical than establishing a governmental model in the accepted sense of the word. In other words, make plans, concepts, and precautionary scenarios to meet and prepare for the requirements of the transitional stage, in light of the spreading conviction that it will come some day, as a temporary interlude between occupation and independence.

[17 Mar p 6]

[Text] In an attempt to explore the general popular mood in the occupied territories, the following question was posed: What occupies the minds of Palestinians at the present time? The answer included friendly advice that goes something like this: Work for your country as if it will exist tomorrow, and for your intifadah as if it will continue forever. Palestinians could look for a decision in such an equation and determine their activities on both fronts of peace and war in order to ensure the progress of domestic building, develop the level of confrontation with the Israeli occupation, and improve its conditions. It has become necessary to break the circle of uneasy balance between the Palestinians' attempt for independence and Israel's insistence on retaining the occupation by bolstering the processes of constructing the level of independence, the structures of which are political and technical committees and supreme councils, and by destroying the reality of occupation by making the confrontation universal.

Political Working Groups

After several long months of experience, the political working groups, which are under the aegis of Dr. Sari Nusaybah and Ziyad Abu-Ziyad, appear to have overcome the fate of the popular and local committees, which have retreated behind a screen that has been lowered over their previous stages. However, it gives the political working groups an opportunity to merge into the current stage and its necessary organizations.

The popular committees were born out of the womb of the masses' phase of the intifadah. National committees were distributed in districts, quarters, and the alleys of refugee camps. In essence, they formed a popular regime, which the intifadah recognized for three-fourths of its first year. It was the administrative authority in areas that were free of direct expressions of the occupation, including Israeli Defense Force, which were withdrawn from the scene of domestic intifadah activities, and

which resorted to waging their warfare at the confrontation lines. However, this form of "administrative governing," which took on the characteristics of the intifadah, lost its place in a relatively short period of time and was replaced by veiled, armed bands from various organizations and factions who plunged recklessly through the channels of Palestinian fighting forces, rushing to apply the "law of organizations." This was a reflection of efforts and dissimilarity in points of view with regard to several issues and ways of administering the new power, as well as a reflection of the competition for influence, which lay behind this.

As for the political and technical working groups under the aegis of Nusaybah and Ziyad Abu-Ziyad, they were born in the Madrid stage, in hopes that they would be the possible core of authority or, at least, one of its instruments. They covered, first of all, the elements that were lost as a result of the "absent" former committees and, secondly, answered the needs of the negotiating stage. As Nusaybah explained, they also "gave technical support to the negotiating delegation, providing all of the detailed data required to study any given issue." They also are concerned with "the study of infrastructural issues and future issues." Nusaybah thinks that the accomplishments of the political and technical working groups during the first five months since their formation "equal the efforts of the 25 years" that preceded them. The groups single-handedly perform the task of developing the performance of the negotiators and have "raised the level of planning that touches the future of Palestinians, even in the shadow of the suspension of negotiations."

Nusaybah and the others were hopeful that the work of these groups and technical crews could remain "calm without media hype." However, keeping developments like this under wraps was impossible, especially since the activity inside Orient House became very visible, after the negotiators rejected the occupation's commitment to silence vis-a-vis certain overt political practices and activities. Moreover, the supreme councils and basic institutional organizations were born and found a welcome with those who considered them the necessary first practical exercises toward, and early preparations for, exploring the possibility of assuming power. However, they faced criticisms from a sector that thought it necessary for the new organizations to be derived from democratic elective processes to ensure everyone's right to participate.

This criticism includes two opposing matters: a "negative," indirect call for delay, and a positive alternative, which would be required and right if appropriate circumstances warranted and if the transition was determined to be over the bridges leading to power. Everyone now knows that some of this power is nonexistent and that the power that does exist is inoperative. Proceeding with that carries the dangers of collapse, and this is what limits the groups' work in the direct tasks set for them by the founders.

Legitimate Power

If what some expect is true as regards the possibility of certain Palestinian factions heading—in the future—toward forming opposition political parties, this raises the following question: Are the political organizations and councils of authority, which are now being formed under the aegis of the centrist movement in the PLO, the "party of the center," as it pleases some of them to call it? Will the center movement continue to hold fast to equality of balance among the various factions?

If the "Palestinian transitional self-government" conducted direct, free elections, leading to changes in the composition of the PLO and its role, as some infer, this could impose a possible equation between the first question and the latter inference, on the basis that the future of the centrist trend, and its ultimate form, will be determined in light of the relationship that is formed between the PLO and the transitional authority at the moment of its birth. This explains the PLO's refusal to continue playing a behind-the-scenes game in the peaceful settlement process and its insistence on directly entering the negotiating arena to ensure determining the essence of the transitional stage and its progress toward establishing the state.

The last inference includes similar possibilities to explain what's going on inside and outside the Palestinian "Government" building, since it is an early preparation for birth and the first outfitting of the baby's room. In political terms, it is building the "structures" of the future state. As for the building permits, they come through three conduits to ensure legitimacy. Media sources refer to:

- Tasking from the Palestinian leadership. There might be found in these directives preparations for itself and cadres, in order to ensure the most success in subsequent stages.
- Previous consultation and coordination between the "inside" and "abroad," on the basis of proposals put forth by certain personages from the occupied territories, which gain the blessing of the political leadership.
- Individual initiatives. More than any other, this channel has been subjected to criticisms and charges of rashness, in attempts to win ministries in the process of being established.

This broad positive "infiltration" of the peace process is equaled and paralleled by sporadic "explosions" on the war front. Both of these trends are the oars that Palestinians are using today to ensure that their boat gets across. They say, "Work for your state as if it will be established tomorrow, and work for your intifadah as if it will continue forever."

Study Examines Golan Population, Land Use

93AF0483A Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 26 Feb 93
p 7

[Article: "Reports On the Golan Heights: Problems and Land Use"]

[Text] We continue to publish some of the papers presented at the Study Day sponsored in Jerusalem 19 Feb 93 by the Arab Development Association. The papers deal with the status of the Syrian Golan Heights after 25 years of occupation.

When the Golan was occupied by Israel in 1967, all depopulated areas were considered state land and 90 percent of the Golan was therefore expropriated. Israeli authorities also expropriated 30 percent of the land belonging to residents of the five remaining villages (30 square km from the original 100 square km). The expropriation was justified on the following grounds:

- Those lands were needed for military or security purposes.
- They were needed by the environmental protection department.
- The lands served the public interest of a group of residents or the (non-Arab) population.
- Those who did not have titles in their possession did not own their land (which they inherited as a family legacy), which could, consequently, be confiscated.

The population of Arab villages that still remain in the occupied Golan is estimated at about 17,000.

Occupation authorities have attempted since the annexation law of 1981 to undermine the national identity of the residents and to assimilate them in Israeli society.

Our report will discuss the problems of villages and land use in the Golan as an example of policies aiming at uprooting us and plundering our lands. Majdal Shams, the largest such village, will be used as a model. We will explore the facts we were able to gather and the conclusions that can be extrapolated.

Preliminary information contained in Israeli plans indicate the following:

- The village of Majdal Shams, with a population of 8,000, has an area of 1,750 dunams according to the 1983 survey map (a dunam equals 1,000 square meters).
- The village of Baq'atha is estimated to have a population of 2,000 and an area of 1,552 dunams.
- The village of Mas'adah has an estimated population of 2,000 and an area of 880 dunams.
- The village of 'Ayn Qaniyyah has a population of 1,500 and an area of 710 dunams.
- The village of al-Ghajar is similar in area and in population to the village of 'Ayn Qaniyyah.

Majdal Shams lies on the southwestern foot of Jabal al-Shaykh at an altitude of 1,100 to 1,300 meters above sea level. It is bounded to the north by the very steep foot of one of the Jabal al-Shaykh summits; to the east by the cease-fire line, which lies only a few meters from a village residence; to the west by the former Jabatha al-Zayt village on whose ruins the (Nafi Atif) settlement was built; and to the south by Taltayn. Such natural and artificial boundaries made residential expansion almost impossible. This becomes evident from the following:

- The village has an estimated 1,200 homes rising on 1,185 dunams, and it is divided into two sections. The first is the village center (the old hamlet), where homes are semiattached and buildings are zoned for 50 percent of the land area. The second is the outer village (the new lanes), which is larger in size. Buildings in this section are zoned for 36 percent of the land area.
- An area of 5 dunams planned as an industrial site is owned by several individuals, but it is claimed by the "Israel Land Management Authority." Under the circumstances, it is difficult to put this area to use.
- Public building sites are haphazardly scattered throughout the village. Some of those are already built, and the rest are also supposed to be built but are difficult to utilize because of unsuitable locations.
- The same applies to areas designated as public parks and playing fields.

Those areas are under the jurisdiction of the local council, which, like other local councils in other Golan villages since 1974, is appointed by Israeli authorities.

We go back to the second area of item 1, or the outer village.

This area has a section capable of accommodating residential expansion. It is composed of several sites, which we will enumerate according to location:

- An estimated 100 dunams, on which 70 homes now rise, on a very steep site to the north of the village.
- An area of some 80 dunams to the west of the village, which now accommodates 45 homes.
- An area of about 240 dunams, which now accommodates 50 homes and lies to the south of the village (Tallat-al-Shumays to the west of the village entrance).
- An area of 50 dunams, which now supports 20 homes, lying to the south of Tallat-al-Rihana east of the entrance. A military zone lies to the north of the Tallat. The zone is surrounded by land mines placed only a few meters away from the homes. (One such mine exploded a few years ago killing one child and maiming another.)

According to survey maps, those four areas are currently the only ones capable of residential expansion. The problem is that Israeli authorities—represented by Israel Land Management and by the zoning board run by the intelligence officer—claim that the land is Israeli property (being former state lands), even though most of the lots are privately owned and the rest are village property originally left as grazing areas to be used by all residents.

Israeli authorities have applied, and continue to apply, all kinds of pressure to keep residents from building on their lots. Examples are:

1. When owners of existing homes need alterations or additions to their properties, the authorities seize the opportunity to withdraw building permits even though

they are fully aware that property owners had obtained those permits from the zoning board itself only a few years earlier.

The authorities, through the zoning board, have recently obtained a court order to demolish a home on the village outskirts on the pretext that it was built on government land even though the homeowner bought the lot from its [former] owners and paid the relevant taxes to the municipal council. The court order irked village residents who held a town meeting that condemned zoning board action and emphasized their insistence on their property rights. They relayed their resolutions to Israeli authorities and to domestic and international public opinion, explaining that their land can not be bargained away by any means no matter what sacrifice it takes.

2. The telephone company has been used as a pressure tool. The company disconnected service to several homes, claiming that they were without permits, even though it has no jurisdiction at all in this area and even though the homes in question have had telephone service for several years prior to the cut-off.

3. New permits are rarely issued on the same pretext that the lots are Israeli property and those seeking permits must so acknowledge in writing before they are allowed to build. Those who prove that they own their lots are required to declare in affidavits that adjacent land is state property.

Land-use problems in our villages may be summarized as follows:

- The physical lack of village public areas such as parks and playgrounds.
- The physical lack of industrial zones even though the zoning board fines those who supposedly practice their industrial trades in industrial zones [as published].
- Little area is zoned for building as is evidenced by the stratospheric prices of land zoned as building lots even though they are liable to expropriation and to various irritants. The problem worsens as the population increases and young couples are hard put to find a piece of land on which to build their future homes.

Editor Expects More EC Contacts, Greater Role

93AF0483B Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 14 Mar 93
p 5

[Article by 'Ali al-Khalili: "Reviving Europe's Role in the Peace Process"]

[Excerpts]

[Passage omitted on recent PLO meetings with Belgian, British, and French officials]

The series of meetings with EC [European Community] countries will continue under all circumstances. The "knot" has been untied whether Israel likes it or not. The significant thing is that the results of those meetings will be reflected in the next stage, whether Israel agrees or

not, in the form of a new political development, which necessarily means two basic elements introduced to the Madrid negotiating format. These are Europe's role and the PLO's direct role in this format, which previously excluded the European role and drove the PLO to the background.

Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yosi Beilin, on his part, belittles both elements and sneers at the Palestinians' "delusion", as he puts it, that Europe would play an effective role in the proposed political settlement. He apparently thinks that our Palestinian side was to supplant the United States with Europe, which is a naive supposition, of course. There will never be a substitute for the United States, which is the primary sponsor of the peace conference. The addition here is to propel Europe to play its natural role, alongside the United States, Russia, and others, in this fateful conference that will impact not only the map of the Middle East, but also the maps of several other regions that are entwined in this world and particularly in this age of change.

Israel, in view of its special relationship with the United States, would naturally oppose participation by any other party that would bring political and economic weight to bear on the negotiation equation. It insists that the United States, as a major, powerful, and "full partner," is sufficient for both sponsorship and participation!

It is obvious that the United States itself also subscribes to the same view and is not a great admirer of the new European move. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in that connection that his country would not resume formal dialogue with the PLO since, in his view, it has not succeeded in helping Washington confront issues of terrorism. [passages omitted]

Fatah-FRC Battle Affects Refugees in Lebanon

93AF0494A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 8 Apr 93
pp 2

[Article by Muhammad Shuqayr in Beirut: "Initiatives To Solve Fatah-Revolutionary Council Conflict Stalled"]

[Text] The Palestinian situation in Lebanon is struggling with a set of accumulating problems to which it is apparently difficult to find solutions. These problems are not confined to the mounting ferocity of the conflict between the Fatah movement, which is under the leadership of President Yasir 'Arafat, and the Revolutionary Council [FRC], which is led by Abu-Nidal, now that the ongoing war of liquidations between them has gone too far for the leaders involved to put a halt to it. Even though they have been able to freeze it, they have had trouble finding a permanent settlement for ending the bloody conflict.

The problems that threaten the Palestinian situation are primarily the result of the PLO's fading interest in the dispersal of Palestinians in Lebanon, giving priority instead to the intifadah in the occupied territories and the situation in Jordan. These situations, in its view, are

highly relevant to the negotiations being conducted to find a just solution to the Middle East crisis.

Palestinian factions in Lebanon are living in bad political, organizational, and economic conditions, accompanied by a "distinct outlook" relating to the inconsistent attitudes of the peace talks; Fatah alone seems to be in the arena, unlike the others, who classify themselves with the opponents of the talks.

What increases the sense of loss overshadowing the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, is the feeling, among the mass of Palestinians, that they have been abandoned—even that the PLO leadership is no longer making an effort to call attention to their social and living conditions, after having made all the decisions and steps, most of all to dissolve Fatah's military body and halt the payment of stipends to the families of martyrs.

There are those who justify the PLO leadership's policy of parsimony toward its ranks and supporters in Lebanon by saying that Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat has for a long time been trying to extricate the Palestinians from the civil war in Lebanon, beginning with his covert cooperation with all the signatories of the al-Ta'if Accord in this regard. He is pursuing a policy that seems more realistic and receptive than his old policy.

On this front, a prominent Lebanese says that 'Arafat has succeeded in keeping the Palestinians neutral in Lebanon's domestic game. He is asking the Lebanese Government only to give priority to looking after the civil rights of the Palestinians, and to provide them with the basic necessities of life. The prominent Lebanese asserts that the decision to disband the PLO's military body led by Fatah, is also due to the material circumstances it is experiencing, which force it to adopt a policy of reining in spending. This has primarily affected the Palestinians in Lebanon.

As a result of all these factors, the Palestinian scene in Lebanon, in the political sense of the word, has been left to the powers and initiating of the "Palestinian household," which in its turn complains of the absence of political principles that rule the current relations between Palestinian factions.

The absence of these principles has led, and is still leading, to an absence of protection for the Palestinians, and the supremacy of recklessness over the wish to control the situation and provide a barrier to block the way of the renewal of the violent incidents between Fatah and the Revolutionary Council.

The internal fragmentation opened the Palestinian situation, openly and overtly, to all the negative possibilities stemming from outside efforts aimed at the Palestinians.

The prominent Lebanese acknowledges that the efforts to gather together the Palestinians constantly collide with difficulties fed, most of the time, by the absence of serious efforts and nonexistence of any practical plan at least to solve the problem between Fatah and the Revolutionary Council. According to this information, the attempt by Shaykh As'ad Bayud al-Tamimi, a member of

the Palestine National Council and one of the Islamic Jihad, did not lead to any practical results. The reason was that the effort was limited to the stage of accepting it or not accepting it, and that the parties involved were still discussing the position of beginning to explore on that basis. This is why the role of Shaykh al-Tamimi was merely a plan for an effort.

Additionally, the efforts undertaken by Palestinian factions in Sidon to seek an end to the bloody conflict never moved beyond media statements, still blocking the shaping of a truce plan that could enjoy the favor of both sides. This was despite the joint action of the secretary general of the Communist Action Organization in Lebanon, Muhsin Ibrahim, and the president of the Popular Nasirite Organization, Deputy Mustafa Sa'd, with their invitation for the Palestinians to launch a cohesive initiative, adopted by the Palestinian factions except for Fatah, supported in Lebanon primarily in Sidon, and, secondly, by various national and Islamic forces.

AL-HAYAH has learned that Ibrahim and Sa'd advised the Palestinian factions to work toward creating a protective Palestinian barrier between the two sides, and pressure them to stop the assassinations. They sought the intervention of Lebanese activists as observers of a truce charter.

Sa'd assured the Palestinian factions that "we cannot be the spearhead in the mission that must begin with the Palestinians. For our part, we are helping and supporting the formation of an honorable charter."

There were accusations from a Fatah official in the Ayn-al-Hulwah camp that "Syria is supporting the Revolutionary Council," which created a new problem in the quest for ways out of the war of purges. In the assessment of the prominent Lebanese, the accusations "were no more than a rash, local slip under the pressure of feelings of siege, violence, and tribulation."

Official Position?

The same prominent person, closely involved in Palestinian affairs, thinks that the language used by one of the local Fatah commanders "was not the language used officially, nor did it express the course set by the PLO command; otherwise it would have been said differently." He rules out that the accusations had anything to do with the central Fatah position which comes from Tunis. He reasons that whoever said it was intent on looking for a local outlet for the burden borne by the commanders in Lebanon. The prominent Lebanese also ruled out the possibility of considering the accusation a problem between Damascus and the PLO, as "this line is not likely in the very near future. The PLO has another direction, moving toward Syria and Lebanon and their invitation to find a final solution to this stubborn problem."

The prominent Lebanese attributes the central Palestinian move toward Beirut and Damascus for solving the problem, to the conviction of the PLO leadership that

the land in which the bloody events are occurring is Lebanese, in which Syria has a basic role."

The prominent Lebanese classifies Fatah's announcement in the South—that it was responsible for launching Katyusha rockets into the occupied Palestinian territories—as "a failed blow, only to regain a material level, and perhaps to apply pressure to hasten an end to the assassinations."

He sees the Palestinian claims of having launched the Katyushas as an effort that did not achieve its desired political and media objectives, especially as the announcement was in conflict with previous announcements. When Israel acknowledged that rockets had landed, Fatah denied its responsibility and any connection.

The prominent Lebanese rules out that the announcement of the bombardment had any political significance as it did not go beyond its limits to the subject of the negotiations, while 'Arafat was in command of the hawks in the Palestinian camp and did not need to conjure up the bombardment, which had not been in earnest, from the political or military point of view.

He also ruled out that the target of the announcement could have been Syrian-Palestinian relations, which are ruled by an understanding on a unified position on the negotiations, with the foreign ministers meeting anew in Damascus. He believes that conditions are not right for the reciprocal pressure between Syria and the PLO and that the latter would not put these relations at risk so lightly.

As to how to deal with the ongoing war between Fatah and the Revolutionary Council, the prominent Lebanese asserts that he has not sensed, according to his knowledge of the Palestinian position, any intention on the part of the PLO to concoct a problem such as that in Lebanon. Contrary to its public position in Beirut, it had sent letters through several intermediaries to the parties involved in Lebanon. Some of these had gone to Syria, stating the need to work to control the recklessness, particularly as the camps were no longer surrounded, having spread to areas subject to state authority, and as Syria had the ability to intervene to put an end to the problem.

Report Profiles PIJ, Youth Movement Histories

93AE0463A Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 27 Feb 93 pp 42-43

[Article: "Development of Islamic Movements Inside Green Line, Appearance of New Movements, Emergence of Islamic Leaders Who Influenced Their Rise"]

[Text]

Islamic Jihad Family

This movement was founded in 1979 by Farid Abu-Mukhkh (Abu-'Azzam). It derives in its principles from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) movement that Shaykh 'Izz-al-Din al-Qassam founded in 1935. It believes that Palestine must remain an Arab Islamic state as it was and as the words "Palestinian," "Arabic," and "Muslim" imply—a Palestine that is for the Palestinians (a homeland), for nationalists

(Arabism), and for Islam (belief). The Islamic Jihad Family [asrah al-jihad al-islami] worked secretly in the triangle area, which was divided into three parts or bodies by locality. One part, in the Umm al-Fahm area to the north, was headed by Tawfiq Muhanna (Mahajinah); one part, in the central region, was based in Baqah al-Gharbiyah under the leadership of Farid Abu-Mukhkh; the third part, in the Kafr Qasim area, was headed by 'Umar Sarsur. Each front had an administration composed of a treasurer to gather membership dues and contributions, a military guide, and a religious guide. Each front worked independently, recruiting and organizing its members from local people who came mostly from middle-class families and were less than 25 years old. Although each front of the Jihad Family appeared to work independently, the truth was that coordination obviously took place between its three parts: Abu-Mukhkh was in charge, and the head of the northern front, Tawfiq Muhanna, and the person in charge of the southern front, 'Umar Sarsur, assisted. They worked in an organized manner and divided their members into groups and teams. Each team included four members, including the officer. There was a team for liaison with the other teams. Abu-Mukhkh was the only person who knew all members of the teams. He brought together about 70 members in his organization: 25 of them came from Baqah al-Gharbiyah (the headquarters area); the rest of the members were from villages of the Umm al-Fahm-Qalansuwah-Kafr Qasim triangle.

The movement derived its ideas from the theory of Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish, whom it considered its spiritual guide. It proposed to him that he should head the Jihad Family organization. Although Darwish did not announce his public support for the movement, he concentrated on building spiritual and social solidarity in Islamic society, particularly among youth. Farid Abu-Mukhkh, on the other hand, hoped to achieve unity-related political goals at the Palestinian, nationalist, and local level. We will deal in detail later with Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish—his life, his theory, and the extent of its influence on the development of Islamic movements inside the Green Line—after we talk about the Muslim Youth Movement, which was founded in 1983 after Israeli authorities had arrested Shaykh Nimr Darwish and 100 persons from Islamic movements. The authorities tried them in military courts. Complete secrecy surrounded the trial, and the records have remained secret to the present day. At the time, the prosecution failed to prove the charges brought against Darwish as spiritual leader of the movement. The court could see that Darwish suffered from paralysis of his left hand and could not have participated in the criminal acts attributed to him and those arrested with him. Nevertheless, he was convicted of membership in the organization and of incitement and was sentenced to three years in prison. The head of the Jihad Family, Farid Abu-Mukhkh, was sentenced to 15 years in prison. After Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish was released in 1983, the Muslim Youth Movement made its appearance.

Muslim Youth Movement

The movement was founded in 1983 in a form different from that of the Jihad Family. It spread in mass centers, and its name differed from town to town. It included the Islamic League in al-Tayyibah, Umm al-Fahm, and Nazareth. It also included other socially oriented working committees, such as the Piety and Good Works Society in Acre, the Charitable Goals Society in Jaffa, the Religious Society in Kafr Qasim, and the Piety and Devoutness Society. All these societies were officially registered with the Interior Ministry and with local authorities as organizations with humanitarian, nonmaterial goals whose basic aim was to provide social and religious services to the local community. In other words, this movement made its appearance publicly, unlike the Jihad Family, which adopted secrecy at its founding. Although these committees did not unite officially, in fact there was clear and open coordination among them. Their members met from time to time to study future projects, exchange ideas, and give aid. The members of the committees viewed Shaykh 'Abdallah Darwish as their religious leader and spiritual guide. They saw in Shaykh Darwish's ideas their salvation from their own and their community's financial straits. The movement and the committees that emerged from it carried out social and cultural activities whereby the members sought to work to improve the conditions of Arab citizens. Israel, they believed, had done nothing to improve their conditions; they therefore considered it their duty to take an interest in their affairs themselves, holding to basic Islamic principles such as almsgiving, as embodied in giving aid to the needy on the material level. On Darwish's recommendation, alms committees were established in all Arab villages and cities to offer aid to the needy and undertake public works not funded by the state budget. Through these committees, the movement was able to arouse the zeal of Muslim youth and exploit their abilities to perform constructive works for Muslim society. Shaykh Darwish saw in social activity a tool for spreading Islam and deepening Islamic thought among the youthful masses, so that they would perform voluntary works and activities that would have a positive effect on the movement's popularity in the Arab districts. Muslim leaders of the committees would make their appearance carrying the banner of Islam, and they would be influenced by the method of the movement's spiritual guide, Shaykh Darwish. By means of these committees Islamic leaders did in fact make their appearance, such as Shaykh Ra'id Salah (Mahajinah), Shaykh Khalid Ahmad Muhanna, and Shaykh Hashim 'Abd-al-Rahman, all of whom were young people born in 1958 of middle-class families. They studied in the same schools, approached Islam in their high school years, and considered Darwish their spiritual leader. They continued their studies in the Islamic law faculty of Hebron University and became teachers in their villages, but were dismissed in the early eighties.

The activities of this front were not limited to helping the needy through alms committees. There were other activities. The first Islamic Work Camp was founded in

April 1984. It resembled the camp that the Muslim Brotherhood organized in Egypt in 1930. The public contributed generously to the Muslim Youth Movement at the time: donations amounted to almost \$50,000. The movement was successful in kindling the zeal of the public, so that each donated according to his ability for the service of the masses. Contributions were not limited to money, but included contributions of goods. Some people volunteered to build medical clinics. Dr. Sulayman Ahmad Aghbariyah, for example, contributed a clinic valued at \$400,000 to serve the public. The movement opposed its members' participating in Western observances such as Mothers' Day. The opposition was expressed in "Letter One," which emanated from Umm al-Fahm. It urged boycotting Western music, Western dress, nightclubs, dancing, and drinking. It supported the creation of an Islamic theater instead of other places of entertainment. It made mosques places for learning, study, and education through free courses, such as Koranic recitation and exegesis.

As we have indicated, these two movements derived their principles and ideas from the theory and thoughts of Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish. We must devote some lines to this personality because of his influence on the development of Islamic movements inside the Green Line between the seventies and eighties and until the present.

Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish was born in Kafr Qasim in 1948. At first he was a member of the Communist Party—until 1965. Under unclear circumstances, Darwish changed his attitude toward the Communist Party and moved toward Islam. He studied in Nabulus between 1969 and 1972 in the Islamic school and obtained a diploma qualifying him to teach in the primary schools in his country. He was active in preaching and spiritual direction in mosques and delivered lectures in the villages of the Triangle. He had a talent for speaking, cultural ability, and a powerful personality, enabling him to attract the public around him, especially young students from high schools and above. In 1975, he wrote a book in which he developed his theory and ideas under the title "Toward Islam." In it he argued the need to return to religious roots. Muslim youths and intellectuals, he believed, had been exposed to a process of ideological brainwashing by imperialist thinkers after the collapse of the Islamic state. These thinkers had separated Muslims from knowledge of Islamic learning and had brainwashed them by means of imperialist ideas that these thinkers transmitted during Muslims' university study. As a result, the Islamic community had been weakened and had become unable to resist domination by imperialism and its ideas. To confront this foreign challenge and restore the dignity that once existed, believers must return to Islam and to the vitality of Islam, not only in order to stand up the imperialism, but also in order to create and establish a full and complete life on the path of Islam. Thus said Shaykh Darwish. Everyone must be convinced of the duty to worship one God. By calling to Islam he believed he was strengthening the faith of Muslims. Those astray

would return to their senses and to their true Islamic roots. He devoted a portion of his book to developing his Islamic religious viewpoint, which held that Islam is the path of complete life and tolerant humanism. He supported his argument with Koranic verses and Prophetic traditions that described the works of early Muslims as justice and equality between Muslims in all parts of the world. He held Islam to be the perfection of vital humane principles. It was in the interest of all mankind to follow the example of Muslims, for Muslims were able to overcome the misguidance and delusions spread by the West and the great powers, which, in his view, intended to get rid of Islam. The ideological struggles were present in the Koran. Dominance in the end would be by means of Islam, and it was in the interest of the world [to reject] failed beliefs. Although Darwish's book was addressed to all Muslims, its main object was young people, for he saw the return of the rising generation to Islam as the first for all Muslim believers—he having been a teacher of young people. His experience of a secular ideology had enabled him to understand the modern secular facts that Muslims face. In his book and his lectures in mosques and schools, he praised Islam. A year after his book was published, he addressed to Muslim youths a letter no less impassioned than what he had published in his book. He warned of the dangers facing Islam from imperialists, Western politicians, orientalist, and evangelists. By means of these people imperialists were trying to eliminate Islam in Europe and the United States by controlling educational institutions even in the Islamic countries. They were scheming to entice Muslim young people to embrace modern secular theories in order to weaken Islamic thought in Islamic society internally. Thus they would expedite foreign domination, so that imperialism would dominate all parts of the Islamic world politically and militarily; and this was happening now. He believed that the principles of Islam needed to be spread anew; for by means of these principles it would be possible to eliminate and overcome imperialist ideas in all political and military fields, liberate the Islamic community from all those ideological principles, and form a barrier to domination by foreign forces over the Islamic world. He stressed the distinctive social features of Islam. He thought that by a

return to Islam the ranks of the nation would be unified and strife prevented. To attain unity and link the present to the past we must return to Islam, especially among the ranks of young people; then the community will be able to develop in knowledge and socially and will recover its proud place in the world.

Although these ideas were not exactly original with Shaykh Darwish, who adopted existing ideas that many reformers such as Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani had defended, Darwish developed them and was not a mere follower. He espoused the principles and path of Imam Muhammad 'Abduh and the theory of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hasan al-Banna in Egypt. He used letters and social activity to attract young people and urge them to return to Islam. In this respect there was great similarity between his theory and the theory of such Muslim Brotherhood leaders as Hasan al-Banna, Jalal Kishk, and Yusuf (al-Qardawi), although he denied the existence of any influence on his theory and his writing other than the influence of the Koran, Prophetic tradition, and the legacy of pious early Muslims.

In fact, Darwish's theories and methods led to fears in his community, especially among figures who saw him as a propagandist and advocate of the Muslim Brotherhood. They saw his viewpoint as antagonistic to the secular education they wanted for their children. Complaints against him accumulated in his file at the Education Ministry. There were also complaints by officials who charged that his speeches and appeals for a return to Islam in the schools contradicted the goals and purposes of the Education Ministry. Because his ideas displeased officials, he was dismissed from the education system in 1979 and became one of 31,000 unemployed. He lived on national insurance payments that he received because of physical disability incurred from an attack of polio and on his modest income from a vegetable store.

That is the biography of Shaykh Darwish in brief. We have presented it because of the clear and tangible influence this personality has had on the development of Islamic movements inside the Green Line. We hope that in setting down this sketch of the life of this eminent shaykh we have given him his due and given you your due by means of this discussion.

Businessman Discusses Factory, Industrial Bank

93AF0464A Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 27 Feb 93 pp 35-36

[Interview with Palestinian businessman Kamal Hassunah; place and date not given: "Cement Company To Begin Operations Next Spring"]

[Text] Brisk activities by Palestinian businessmen to obtain permits for industrial and financial institutions and their new services are creating an atmosphere of optimism and a desire for information among citizens in the occupied territories, despite the harsh circumstances.

This optimism stems from the citizens feeling that the actions of businessmen and financiers are valuable and that they know what the results will be. Therefore, they do not sense danger.

In its economic role, AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI has tirelessly met with economists, businessmen, and experts to pose questions that citizens have about the economic situation.

In this edition, AL-BAYADIR met with Professor Kamal Hassunah, owner of an electrode factory and one of the founders of a cement company and other new economic facilities. We asked him questions about some of these businesses.

[AL-BAYADIR] You recently obtained a license to establish a company to manufacture cement. Tell us about how you got the idea to found this company and the obstacles that you faced in obtaining the permit.

[Hassunah] I got the idea to establish the cement company more than 10 years ago. I founded the electrode factory in 1973, which was the only factory of its kind in the region. The profits that accrued to the shareholders encouraged me to start collecting data as a preliminary study about the raw materials required for the cement industry.

In 1979, I proposed the idea of establishing a cement factory in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the mayor of Hebron, the late Fahd al-Quwasimi, who enthusiastically supported the idea as a strategic project. He also noted the dire need for this material and for the economic and social dimensions that the citizens would gain. He considered it important to encourage the construction industry and exploit local raw materials. After approval was obtained in 1979, the company was officially registered with the authorities on behalf of 212 founding businessmen in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in accordance with the founding contract and the company's bylaws and according to Jordanian law.

The company's board of directors began to search for the required raw materials, using foreign companies and experts who specialize in this work. This work went on for more than two years. They began in the far north of the West Bank and proceeded southward until they discovered the best sites 10 km south of Hebron, which contained the materials needed to manufacture cement. These materials are limestone and alkali. They were

found in commercial quantities and are of excellent quality. Three-thousand dunums were purchased for this purpose, and the necessary digging operations were begun at this site. Samples were analyzed to ascertain the quality and quantity, which had to be sufficient to last a number of years. These stages, as well as a number of geological and economic studies, cost enormous amounts, all of which were paid by the founders.

In 1982, the company's activities were suspended, because the authorities would not permit us to complete digging operations at the site. They informed us that they did not wish to encourage a strategic industry like this and that they wished to protect the Israeli cement Company from competition.

Eight months ago, the chief of the Civilian Administration approved our request to resume the company's activities once more. Since that date, we have been working to find the funds required for the next steps to bring the project to life. It is expected that we will start operations at the site at the beginning of spring, God willing.

[AL-BAYADIR] There is talk about problems among the company's founders. What is the truth of that?

[Hassunah] With regard to rumors about problems among the cement company's founders, they are untrue. We have heard nothing about misunderstandings or even differences of opinion, neither in the past nor in the present. All of the founders agreed to and insist on establishing the factory, God willing.

[AL-BAYADIR] Regarding the industrial bank for which you obtained a permit, can you tell us about its program and functions to serve local industry? How do you see its ability to develop industry?

[Hassunah] The license that we got for the bank was the result of applications that we submitted to the authorities on behalf of businessmen, industrialists, and merchants. There is a pressing need for this project because of the economic, financial, and investment benefits that could flow back to serve the citizens.

According to the economic study that we conducted, the bank would be a most successful project at the present time and could achieve high profits. Unfortunately, the founders decided to suspend actions to establish it. They made this decision for two reasons:

- The lack of the Jordanian Government's approval, because of its desire to sever connections between the East and West Banks. The industrial bank would want to do business in Jordanian dinars, as well as shekels;
- The amount of risk in making loans and credit operations as a result of no police force or effective courts to achieve justice.

We have tried to encourage lending institutions to establish an investment bank with certain private-sector people and to invest the funds that came from the European Economic Community [EEC] as capital for the bank. This would expand the services and activities of

lending institutions, improve financial and administrative performances in lending operations, and serve the industrial, agricultural, trade, and tourism sectors.

[AL-BAYADIR] One has heard about your role in certain lending institutions. To what extent do these institutions serve the industrial sector?

[Hassunah] During the past six years, the experience of lending institutions has been good, as well as new. They represent the public sector, since there is no national government because of the occupation. Through this experience, those in charge of lending institutions and those who did business with them became concerned about the public sector and public welfare and learned about the nature of business between the public and private sectors. They learned the positive and negative aspects and the needs of our economic community. They learned the parameters of economic planning, in addition to achieving certain developmental and productive goals. They participated in creating new projects within authoritative standards. The most important goals include encouraging:

- one-of-a-kind industries that fulfill citizens' needs;
- industries that use local raw materials;
- industries that create job opportunities;
- industries that operate for export; and.

- industries that give priority to companies, in order to encourage collective labor.

Lending institutions also play an important role in training manpower, conducting economic studies, participating in missions abroad, and conducting specialized forums.

They also have an important role in building relations among the Palestinian people and with governmental and nongovernmental institutions, banks, and Arab and international funds, in addition to international economic relations, especially with the EEC.

No matter how proud the Palestinians are regarding the start of the cement company's operations, the decision of the industrial bank's founders to suspend establishing that bank represents a reversal of the dreams of many industrialists and small businessmen who based considerable planning on this bank and on the possibilities of assistance being granted to them.

In addition, the modest financial potential of lending institutions is the main reason that many grumble about applying for loans without getting any results and are behind the feelings about attempts to put the Palestinian economy at the mercy of agencies capable of making loans. In most cases, these are non-Palestinian agencies.

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